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Recent studies have shown that economic development based on industrial 
districts or clusters is common not only in the Western nations but also among 
many developing countries, as Marshall might have anticipated.  Similarly, in 
the development process of modern Japan, many industrial districts developed in 
various industries.  Interestingly, they were much more organized and 
institutionalized than Marshall described.  This article demonstrates that local 
trade associations had an important role in enhancing Marshallian externalities 
by facilitating joint actions for the supply of public goods, such as the creation of 
“local district brands” and provision of technological and market information.    In 
this article, we consider the case of Kiryu, which was one of the oldest and 
best-known silk weaving districts in modern Japan. 
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  11. Introduction 
Many studies have attempted to explore why small enterprises under 
decentralized production systems have not only survived but also prospered in 
many industrial districts.  As is well known, Alfred Marshall identifies three 
advantages of industrial districts, which consist of small enterprises in a small 
region: information spillover, specialization and division of labor among 
enterprises, and the development of a skilled labor market.1  According to 
Tetsushi Sonobe and Keijiro Otsuka, these agglomeration economies are present 
in contemporary developing economies. 2   However, there seems to be no 
guarantee that such advantages, called agglomeration economies, were generated 
spontaneously and maintained automatically.  Indeed, historical research in 
Europe focuses on the role of diverse production organizations in supporting the 
industrial districts.3 As Francesca Carnevali points out, the trust and cooperation 
needed for market transactions are maintained by trade associations.4  I n   J a p a n ,  
local producers in industrial districts have made many efforts to internalize 
Marshallian externalities through local trade associations [dogyo kumiai].  Such 
fforts have been conducive to sustaining the competitive advantages of 
industrial districts in this country.
e
5 
  It is interesting to note that this concept of internalizing externalities is 
closely related to what Hubert Schmitz calls “collective efficiency.”  This state 
arises from “external economies” and “joint action,” with Schmitz regarding the 
former as related to “passive” and the latter as related to “active” collective 
efficiency.6  Schmitz refers to the local trade association as one of the central 
institutions that facilitates joint action, as verified by the findings of many 
studies in contemporary developing economies. 7   In Emilia-Romagna, as 
Sebastiano Brusco describes, the establishment of associations made it possible 
  2for small entrepreneurs to overcome their lack of knowledge about commerce and 
their weak bargaining power in obtaining raw materials and credit.  More 
important, associations covering entire regions also established technical 
consultancy offices, consortia for marketing, and co-operatives, all of which 
provide guarantees for bank loans at the lowest possible rate of interest.8 
  In this article, we aim to show that the activities of local trade 
associations enhanced and supported Marshallian agglomeration economies for 
the sustainable growth of industrial districts in Meiji Japan (1868–1912).9  W e  
examine the important functions of the local trade associations in the weaving 
districts, which are beyond the scope of Marshallian agglomeration economies.  
In short, joint action helped in supplying public goods; that is, local trade 
associations functioned not only as a providers of technical and market 
information but also as quality control institutions in order to build the 
reputation of the local brand name.  The development process of Kiryu, which 
was one of the most advanced silk weaving districts in modern Japan, serves as 
the best example to demonstrate joint action since Kiryu achieved sustained 
growth with a wide lineup of products for the domestic market and became a 
pioneer in exporting Habutae, or plain silk fabric.    The district’s success required 
continuous improvement of production methods and products while 
simultaneously creating and maintaining its reputation as a high-quality 
producer.10  Without establishing a local trade association, Kiryu could not have 
maintained its position as the most popular silk weaving district in Japan.    More 
interestingly, while Kiryu’s growth was based on developing a putting-out system 
with a large number of small enterprises, local producers also jointly established 
large factories, with some financial support from the central government, in order 
to benefit from economies of scale in the throwing, dyeing, and finishing processes.   
  3The operation of this industry serves as an example of the joint action that 
Marshall envisaged as necessary for realizing the division of labor. 
   In the second section of this article, we provide an overview of the silk 
weaving industry development in Meiji Japan and explain how important it is to 
explore the case of Kiryu.  We will also review increases in the number of local 
trade associations and in the development of a supporting legal system.  At the 
same time, we investigate how the government of Gunma prefecture, where 
Kiryu is located, developed a legal system to support the local trade association.  
The third section explores to what extent the trade association maintained and 
enhanced the conventional Marshallian agglomeration economies and the extent 
to which the joint establishment of large firms contributed to the development of 
flexible specialization while enabling scale economies.  The fourth section 
examines how actively local public goods were supplied by the association.  The 




2. The Development of Silk Weaving Industry in Meiji Japan   
2.1. An overview 
Table 1 shows the changes in the real value of production in major silk 
weaving prefectures in 1895, 1900, 1905, and 1910.  Although fluctuating, 
production values increased in many prefectures.    In addition, particularly rapid 
growth occurred in the prefectures that produced Habutae for export.11  In  1895, 
the production values were noticeably high in Kyoto (Nishijin-district), Gunma 
(Kiryu and Isesaki-districts), and Fukui.  While Kyoto and Gunma were 
traditional weaving districts, Fukui was newly developing.  Fukui’s production 
  4grew rapidly, and at the turn of the century, Fukui’s ranking became 2nd, 
exceeding that of Kyoto in 1905. 
 
< Table 1 here> 
 
Silk weaving districts can be roughly divided into two groups, as shown in 
Figure 1: domestic-market-oriented districts and export-oriented districts.   
Districts like Tsuruoka, Kawamata, and Fukui, which appear as striped circles on 
the map, were typical Habutae export-oriented, newly growing districts.  Other 
districts produced mainly kimono or obi-sash for domestic markets.  Distinctly 
rapid growth occurred in the export-oriented districts (see the growth rate shown 
in the last column of Table 1).  More interesting, these two groups maintained 
quite different organizations of production within the district.   
Domestic-market-oriented silk weaving districts are more directly relevant to 
Marshallian agglomeration economies since they need more complicated 
processes for production, based on division of labor, than export-oriented districts 
do.  The variety of products in the domestic market-oriented districts was 
generally far wider than that of Habutae export-oriented districts, in which 
semi-finished material for piece dyeing was  produced.  In  other  words,  producers 
in these districts tried to facilitate the division of labor in various ways within the 
district. 
 
<Figure 1 here> 
 
Kiryu was one of the best-known districts whose production was intended 
for domestic market.  Figure 2 shows Kiryu’s long-term trend in the value of 
  5production since 1878.    From the end of the 1870s to the middle of the 1880s, its 
value of production sharply declined.  This is partly because of economic 
recession and partly because of the inferior quality problem that will be discussed 
later.  After the late 1880s, the district experienced rapid recovery and growth 
until the end of the 1890s.    We hypothesize that we can link the trends shown in 
Figure 2 with changes in the structure of production and institutions in the Kiryu 
district: establishment of a local trade association and development of the 
division of labor, such as a putting-out system.12 
 
<Figure 2 here> 
 
A historical review of the Tokugawa Period (1603–1867) will help in 
understanding not only the whole process of the development of the silk weaving 
industry in Japan but also local producers’ movements to reorganize the 
institutional structure of the weaving district after the Meiji Restoration.    At the 
beginning of the Tokugawa Period, silk fabrics were exclusively luxurious because 
only a few privileged people were allowed to wear them—for example, emperors, 
samurai, court nobles, and Buddhist priests.  Thus, Nishijin in Kyoto had been 
the most important silk weaving district since the end of the medieval period 
because Kyoto had been the center of politics, religion, and culture, surrounded 
by the most advanced commercial and industrial areas in Japan.  In fact, after 
the center of politics was moved to Edo (now Tokyo) in the early 17th century, the 
privilege of importing raw silk from China was granted only for producers in 
Nishijin because their customers were noble people. 
  With the economic development in the middle of the Tokugawa Period, 
wealthy merchants and rich people began to wear silk fabrics.  Hence, silk 
  6weaving districts prospered in the countryside, especially in eastern Japan—that 
is, Kiryu, Ashikaga, Yonezawa, and Hachioji, as shown in Table 1.  Kiryu had a 
long history of silk weaving from ancient times, but it rapidly grew after the 
technology of yarn-dyed fabrics and looms was transferred from Nishijin in the 
mid-17th century.13  As a result, fabric markets developed not only in western 
but also in eastern Japan.    After the opening of the ports in the mid-19th century 
and as soon as the silk products began to be imported from the West, the 
Japanese people became absolutely fascinated with their vivid colors, designs, 
and textures.  Many weaving districts—especially those close to Edo, which was 
one of the large markets, and to Yokohama, a major port—tried to launch 
substitutions for imports by using imported dyestuffs, imitating their designs, 
and introducing thin, machine-made cotton yarns as weft.  Above all, Edo 
became a mature market and the center of fashion as weaving districts developed 
in nearby areas—namely Kiryu, Ashikaga, and Hachioji.14  
  After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, further major changes came to the 
industry.  Traditional guilds were dissolved due to a new policy advocating 
freedom of trade; and, as a result, the number of new entrants increased in the 
industry.  Thus, an increasingly large quantity of products of unknown quality 
rapidly flooded the market.  This development caused market disorder so that 
production declined in the early 1880s (see Figure 2).  Producers and traders in 
the traditional industrial districts were trying to organize institutions to substitute 
for the traditional guilds in order to regain their reputations.15  I n  t h e  n e x t  
section, we will again discuss their trial-and-error process of building local trade 
associations as new organizations to provide solutions for the above problems. 
In spite of the confusion and disorder in the market, the weaving industry 
became increasingly more prosperous with the introduction of Western 
  7technologies.  The use of jacquard manufacturing mechanisms with the addition 
of machines for the finishing process—for example, calendars—significantly 
improved design, textures, and luster.    The introduction of synthetic dyestuffs not 
only reduced cost but also made it possible to produce yarns and fabrics with more 
vivid colors.  Since synthetic dyestuffs were originally used for Western textiles, 
the application of this new technology to traditional products resulted in a 
deterioration in the quality of products in the weaving industry, even though the 
original intention was to manufacture products that could compete with Western 
products in the domestic market.  Even so, the new technology gradually made 
Japanese products more fashionable.  Consequently, for many weaving districts, 
design and fashion were the most important factors for competition with other 
districts.16  Thus, how to assimilate new foreign technology and improve the 
products became crucial for every district. 
    After international trade was liberalized in the mid-19th century, export 
markets were also opened to silk fabrics.    Japan’s silk export, including both raw 
silk and silk fabrics, grew rapidly.  Kiryu, which had been engaged in producing 
traditional goods for the domestic market, became the first exporter of Habutae 
silk fabric since 1877, which was a new product.    In the 1880s, the principal silk 
product for export shifted very quickly from handkerchiefs to Habutae.  As 
shown in Table 1, Habutae export grew rapidly with the launching of production 
in Fukui, a newly leading district of Habutae export.   
 
2.2. Establishment of the legal system for a local trade association 
Due to the freedom of trade that led to the demise of the Japanese guild 
[kabu nakama] after the Meiji Restoration, new entrants in many industries 
caused rapid increases in production and distribution, especially in traditional 
  8ones that used simple technologies.  Tetsuji Okazaki defines  kabu nakama as “a 
group composed of members who have kabu,”17 or a business license granted by 
the public authorities.  Therefore, the demise of kabu nakama encouraged new 
entrants to engage in merciless competition by new entrants under the freedom of 
trade principle.  However, extreme confusion, fraud, and cheating in trade also 
followed, thereby resulting in an inferior quality problem.  Such undesirable 
tendencies appeared in both domestic and export markets.  As a result, many 
districts gained a bad reputation. 
To solve this problem, local trade associations were organized, not as a 
revival of kabu nakama but as the new center of joint action for the survival of 
industrial districts.    Prior to developing legal systems for local trade associations, 
local producers voluntarily established such collective organizations in their 
industrial districts in order to compete with other districts, to establish efficient 
production organization by small producers, to restore their reputations, and to 
build successful local brands.  However, this approach proved unsustainable 
because they had no legal basis for imposing sanctions.18  In the case of the 
weaving industry, the spread of inferior-quality fabrics became a nationwide 
problem.    19
The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, which regarded the principle 
of freedom of trade as important, maintained a cautious stance regarding the 
revival of kabu nakama.  Producers and merchants, however, had a strong 
desire to reestablish collective organizations, and the Meiji government wished to 
promote export industries.  Therefore, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce enacted the Rules of Trade Association [Dogyo Kumiai Junsoku] in 
1884.  Although this rule was not compulsory, it was important for local trade 
associations established by merchants and producers to fall in the jurisdiction of 
  9the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce.  Since the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Commerce did not know the details of problems that each trade association 
faced, it introduced the permission system in 1891, in which prefectural 
governments prepared the plans for the regulatory rules of local trade 
associations that produced important commodities and submitted them to the 
Ministry for approval.  Consequently, by 1896, the Ministry had approved the 
rules for 78 local trade associations in 18 traditional industries.20  S u c h  c a s e s  
increased to about 700 in 1909 and to 1029 in 1915, of which the weaving trade 
associations numbered 134.21  In 1900, the Law of Local Trade Associations 
Producing Important Commodities [Juyo Bussan Dogyo Kumiai Ho] was enacted.   
This law was important because all the producers and merchants in the same 
district had to be members under this law. 
Let us review the impacts of the legal system by examining the case in 
Kiryu as an example.  22  After the Meiji Restoration, new entrants produced 
inferior quality goods by using newly imported dyestuffs.  This resulted in the 
destruction of reputation, not only for new entrants but also for the whole Kiryu 
district.  In 1875, weavers in Kiryu, who were feeling the crisis, in vain 
requested the local government to make regulatory rules.  A retail shop of silk 
products in Tokyo put up a big sign over its door: “We do not deal in the products 
of Kiryu.”  Driven by a shared sense of crisis, 171 local producers and traders in 
Kiryu established the Kiryu Company [Kiryu Gaisha23]  in 1878 for collective 
quality control, which was one origin of the local trade association in Kiryu.  
They started making serious efforts to recover their reputation in the market by 
creating quality certification labels.  Such private initiatives in Kiryu were 
known to be quite active.  Similar companies were established in other silk 
weaving districts not voluntarily, unlike Kiryu, but based on suggestions by local 
  10governors. 
In 1882, the Kiryu Company changed its name to the Kiryu Commodity 
Company  [Kiryu Bussan Gaisha] and expanded its membership.  Some 
members, however, refused intervention from this collective organization, 
arguing that such an organization violated the principle of freedom of trade.  
Finally, the Kiryu Commodity Company collapsed in 1890 due to conflicts of 
interests among its members.  Thus, Kiryu district again faced a critical 
situation regarding the quality control of its products.  In 1892, local producers 
organized the Kiryu Commerce and Industry Association [Kiryu Shokogyo 
Kumiai] under the Rules for Trade Associations by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Commerce (enacted in 1884) and set up rules for inspecting products in both 
export and domestic markets in order to eliminate low-quality products and to 
recover their reputation.  Furthermore, in 1894, the Gunma prefectural 
government enacted the Rule of the Local Trade Association for Weaving in 
Gunma Prefecture [Gunmaken Orimono Dogyo Kumiai Kisoku], which required 
producers in diverse activities in the district to become compulsory members.24  
Thus, merchants dealing with raw materials, like dyestuffs and yarns; producers 
engaged in a preparation process; and reed producers, who had not been 
members previously, became the association’s members.  In 1898, the Kiryu 
Trade Association for Commodities [Kiryu Bussan Dogyo Kumiai] was subject to 
the Local Trade Association Law for Important Export Goods, which was enacted 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in 1897.  Weaving-related 
producers who engaged in scouring, rolling, and dyeing were also required to 
become members.  In 1905, the Kiryu Trade Association for Commodities was 
reorganized into the Kiryu Trade Association for Weaving [Kiryu Orimono Dogyo 
Kumiai: KTAW henceforth] under the Law of Local Trade Associations Producing 
  11Important Commodities.  Changing the name from “Commodity” to “Weaving” 
was an advertizing strategy because the former did not signify the activities of 
the association. 25  The articles of partnership in the association were also 
changed, excluding dyers, dyestuff merchants, and cotton yarn merchants from 
the membership, none of whom were directly related to silk production.    In other 
words, this change encouraged limited membership within a district and 
strengthened the leading role of weaving producers or merchant manufacturers 
in the association.  In all likelihood, such a development of legal systems by 
central and local governments strengthened the function of local trade 
associations.  In the next section, we will explore how division of labor in Kiryu 
was facilitated by the trade associations. 
 
 
3. Development of the Division of Labor in Kiryu 
  In this section, we will focus on the specialization and division of labor 
among enterprises that constituted the three sources of Marshallian 
agglomeration economies because this topic is highly relevant to the roles of local 
trade associations.  It must be also pointed out that the extent of the 
development of a skilled labor market and the number of information spillovers 
are not measurable.  In fact, the development of a putting-out system with an 
increasing number of out-weavers brought about increases in the value of 
production in the late 19th century, as shown in Figure 2.  Specialization also 
advanced, especially in dyeing, twisting, and finishing processes, which are 
subject to economies of scale. 
 
3.1. Putting-out system development in Kiryu   
  12  In the putting-out system of the weaving process in Kiryu, weaving 
producers or manufacturers put out yarns as raw materials to out-weavers, who 
usually worked in their homes in rural villages.  The  producers  usually  pre-dyed 
the distributed yarns and completed other preparation processes, such as 
warping  and  winding.  Weaving  producers or manufacturers visited out-weavers 
to distribute yarns, to pick up fabrics later, and to pay them a processing fee.  
Originally, the wives and daughters of farmers became out-weavers primarily in a 
slack  agricultural  season.  The  prefectural government made good reports on the 
development of the putting-out system after the 1880s.    However, unfortunately, 
no statistical data are available until the turn of the century.  According to the 
data surveyed from the prefectural government, the number of weaving 
manufacturers was 724 in 1901 and 468 in 1904, and the number of out-weavers 
was 3796 and 2751, respectively.26  The average number of out-weavers per 
putter for four years was 5.5.  However, as shown in Figure 3, its increasing 
trend is apparent toward the early 1910s. 
There is an interesting survey by Nishijin producers on other weaving 
districts including Kiryu, titled “Weavings in Eastern Japan” (1914).    The aim of 
this survey is clearly identified: “to determine why new weaving districts such as 
Kiryu, Ashikaga, Isesaki, and Hachioji experienced rapid growth.”27  Nishijin 
was proud of its position—namely, as the leading, the most traditional, and the 
best-quality silk weaving district in Japan.  However, Nishijin producers were 
feeling considerable pressure from the growth of “the developing districts.”  
According to this survey, collective cohesion was particularly strong in the 
eastern weaving districts, and the number of full-time out-weavers who had 
sufficient skills was increasing in Kiryu because putters increasingly focused on 
high-quality products.    In the early 1910s, the number of out-weavers per putter 
  13was at least between 20 and 30, which was much higher than the number in 
Nishijin, and it climbed to 400 to 500 during the peak season.28  These  numbers 
are much larger than the prefectural government reported, presumably because 
the Nishijin producers visited large putters.  Statistical data from the local 
government shows an increasing trend in the number of out-weavers until the 
mid-1910s.29  A s  s h o w n  i n  F i g u r e  2 ,  i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  
putting-out system brought about increasing production. 
  The conventional historical consensus has been that the putting-out 
system as a way of organizing production was destined for demise and that the 
factory system would take its place.  When the number of factories increased 
from the late 1910s, accompanying the introduction of power-looms, out-weavers 
dropped dramatically in the 1920s in Kiryu.30  However, recent studies argue 
that this development relates not to the transition from one organization to the 
other but, rather, to the choice between organizations.31    It is true that, when the 
production of high-quality figured fabrics was dominant in Kiryu, weaving 
producers chose manufacture or factory production.  However, their choice was 
not because a centralized production system could realize higher productivity, but 
because the producers were trying to prevent imitation of their important designs 
by out-weavers.  Therefore, they relied on out-weavers only for producing 
ordinary fabrics without special designs and color combinations.  In fact, 
weaving producers in Kiryu used the putting-out system when the market 
demand for relatively simple products increased in the 1880s.    32
  
<Figure 3 here> 
 
 
  143.2. Specialization and sub-contracting in Kiryu 
  Within the Kiryu district, not only the putting-out system for the weaving 
process but also the specialization of other processes developed.    According to the 
articles of partnership for the Kiryu Trade Association for Weaving (1905), the 
association membership was diverse, including weaving producers, 33 fabric 
merchants, scouring producers, silk-yarn merchants, dyers, dyestuff merchants, 
and cotton-yarn merchants.  Besides the above members, there were a lot of 
miscellaneous producers and traders in Kiryu, who specialized in particular 
processes that were needed for producing silk fabrics.  Figure 4 shows the 
activities of weaving producers (merchant-manufacturers) (left) and the 
specialized processes carried out by subcontractors (right) in Kiryu around 1910.  
Many processes were carried out by specialized subcontractors, in which weaving 
producers had an organizational role.  Weaving producers had originally 
engaged in the whole production process, from preparation to weaving, except for 
finishing.  However, as is shown by the double-headed arrows in the figure, 
many processes became outsourced, such as throwing, dyeing, design, weaving, 
and finishing.  Earlier, weaving producers had carried out the dyeing process as 
one of the preparation processes until synthetic dyestuffs, which needed scientific 
knowledge, were introduced.    Responding to a significant increase in the number 
of dyers, the prefectural government included the dyeing industry in its annual 
statistical survey after 1915.34 
 
<Figure 4 here> 
 
  The statistical data collected by KTAW show how dense the 
agglomeration was in Kiryu.  In 1900, there were 853 weaving producers, 37  35
  15fabric merchants, 16 scouring and finishing producers, 62 raw silk merchants, 18 
dyers, 14 dyestuff merchants, 6 cotton-yarn merchants, 12 designers for jacquard 
machines, 25 reed producers, 115 warping [hata-goshirae] producers, and 6725 
out-weavers.36  It is clear from these data that many of the processes formerly 
carried out by weaving producers, such as design, dyeing, and warping, had 
shifted to outsourcing. 
 
3.3 Development of specialization by joint facilities 
  It is important to note that specialization, as described above, further 
developed through the establishment of large-scale joint facilities.  This is 
consistent with the theory of the division of labor by George Stigler, who argues 
that as the size of the market expands, the specialization of firms in specific 
processes increases.37  The joint facilities were established with support from 
the central government, but critically important also was the enthusiasm and 
commitment from the leading members of KTAW.38  Previously, each weaving 
producer had individually outsourced many processes, as is shown in Figure 4.  
However, the large-scale operation of throwing, dyeing, and finishing processes, 
when carried out with advanced machineries, became more efficient and could 
enjoy scale economies.39  The purchase of such machineries, however, required 
investment funds that individual producers could not afford to finance.  By 
jointly establishing new facilities, small weaving producers gained flexible 
specialization.    Let us examine the case of two large-scale firms in Kiryu closely. 
In 1902, the central government implemented a policy to promote and 
develop the silk weaving industry by leasing advanced machines.  In order to 
qualify for leasing a machine from the government, local producers and 
merchants had to establish a joint-stock company in the district.  Therefore, 
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company  [Kiryu Nenshi Gaisha] with modern throwing machines in 
1902—namely, the Kiryu Throwing Company.  Kiryu became one of the six 
selected districts for this policy, and the company was then the largest throwing 
company in Japan.  In this company, there were 10 throwing machines made in 
France and leased by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, and 12 other 
advanced machines owned by the company.  In 1906, there were 12 male 
workers and 126 female workers in the company with 2 steam engines (40 HP).  
It grew rapidly, employing as many as 19 male workers and 180 female workers, 
and was equipped with 3 steam engines (110 HP) in 1910.40  The product—that 
is, thrown silk yarn—was sold not only within Kiryu district but also in other 
districts.    In 1910, this company became the first exporter of thrown silk yarn in 
Japan.41 
Ryomo Preparation and Finishing Co. Ltd [Ryomo Seishoku Kabushiki 
Gaisha], established in 1907, was also important for the development of 
specialization in Kiryu.  Establishment of this company was also supported by 
the industrial promotion policy of the central government to improve the 
finishing process for export fabrics.  In those days, many defects in exported 
fabrics were reported by the Japanese consular in the West.  One of the causes 
for serious defects was an inappropriate finishing process.42  To recover the 
reputation of its exports, the central government decided to support the 
establishment of a finishing company either in Kiryu or in neighboring Ashikaga 
(a silk and cotton weaving district).    The average share of export of silk fabric in 
Kiryu climbed to around 30% in 1900.43  There were, however, only a few 
factories equipped with Western-style finishing in Kiryu, so producers and 
merchants felt that they needed more.    Therefore, the leaders of KTAW launched 
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chosen and Ryomo Preparation and Finishing Co., Ltd., was established, with 14 
advanced finishing machines leased from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce, and began operations in 1908.  In the beginning, it engaged in 
dyeing and finishing for export fabrics and later started production of silk fabrics.   
Though there were only 60 male workers and 30 female workers with one steam 
engine (28 HP) in 1908, it grew rapidly and employed 112 male workers and 114 
female workers in 1910.44    In this company, various processes were mechanized, 
including dyeing, scouring, calendaring, and lustering. 
In sum, both companies discussed above were much different from other 
preparation or finishing factories regarding technology and scale.  For example, 
in 1904, there were only four factories (more than 10 workers) for preparation or 
finishing in Kiryu, all of them smaller than these two.45    However, the number of 
finishing, dyeing, and scouring companies that were members of KTAW grew 
rapidly after the establishment of these two companies: there were 18 in 1906, 24 
in 1910, and 83 in 1920.46  It is likely that former workers from these large 
companies quit their jobs to become independent as owners of small companies.  
While the central government partially supported the establishment of these 
factories, it is clear that private initiatives by KTAW and the development of 
organized specialization by weaving producers played an important role in 
promoting such factories. 
 
 
4. Local Trade Association as a Supplier of Public Goods 
  According to a study by Takanori Matsumoto, which summarizes the 
common features of local trade associations in modern Japan, the associations 
  18had six functions; product inspection, marketing research, public awareness, 
advertisement, infrastructure building, and joint projects.47  While  the  functions 
of local trade associations were varied, it is clear that these functions were closely 
related to the supply of public goods.  In the case of Kiryu, we should note that 
the local trade association had a role in introducing new technology and 
knowledge from the West, such as synthetic dyestuffs, and in creating and 
maintaining Kiryu-brand by quality control.  Obviously, the association 
performed many tasks, such as collecting samples of foreign products for 
members, carrying out statistical surveys in the district, sending members 
abroad for field research, promoting market expansion, protecting property rights 
for design, and encouraging out-weavers and workers by means of incentives.48  
In what follows, we explore joint action by local trade associations in depth. 
 
4.1. Introduction of new technology from the West 
  In the early Meiji Period, Kiryu was well known as the advanced district 
in which local producers aggressively introduced new Western machines—for 
example, Western looms, such as the flying shuttle, jacquard, and finishing roll 
machines.  This district played an important role in diffusing new technologies 
and knowledge to other districts in Japan.  In other words, it was a conduit of 
new technologies and knowledge from the Western countries. 49  S y n t h e t i c  
dyestuff was one of the new technologies that required a knowledge of chemistry.   
As Tomoko Hashino points out, while many weaving districts aggressively 
introduced synthetic dyestuffs in the early Meiji Period, inferior quality in fabrics, 
caused by inappropriate ways of dyeing, became a nationwide problem.  One of 
the reasons was lack of scientific knowledge of dyeing methods.50 
  Though some producers tried to learn chemical dyeing methods 
  19individually, they generally failed to master it.  This problem was so serious in 
Kiryu that, in 1876, the prefectural government sent a lecturer on chemical 
dyeing methods to Kiryu for seventy or eighty local producers.51  K i r y u   C o m p a n y ,  
formerly KTAW, sent several young students to a prefectural medical school to 
study chemistry in 1878.  After graduation in 1880, they started diffusing 
improved dyeing methods for using synthetic dyestuffs.    However, an institute of 
dyeing built by Kiryu Commerce and Industry Association succeeded in widely 
promoting diffusion of better chemical dyeing methods in the Kiryu district.    The 
Kiryu Institute of Dyeing invited Mr. Jiro Yamaoka, an engineering official in the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce who had once learned chemistry in the 
West, to teach at the institute.  From 1884 to 1886, Yamaoka taught improved 
practices as well as the theory of chemical dyeing to local producers in Kiryu.    In 
1896, this institute became Kiryu Town’s Textile School [Choritsu Kiryu Orimono 
Gakko].  It is obvious that the local trade association was a conduit for new 
technology and knowledge, which was critically important for the supply of local 
public goods.52 
 
4.2. Creating Kiryu-Brand by collective quality control 
  Carrying out collective quality control and introducing new technology 
and knowledge were important functions of the local trade association as a 
supplier of public goods.  In general, local trade associations organized by 
producers made strict rules for production quality throughout Japan.  For 
examples, with regard to fabrics and papers, local trade associations set rules for 
dimensions (width, length, and weight) and for materials used in their products.  
In order to maintain a standard quality for products, they also had to set rules for 
methods of inspection and grades quality certification.   As explained earlier,  53
  20when the Kiryu Trade Association for Commodities was reorganized into KTAW, 
it amended the articles of partnership, clearly defining the rights and obligations 
of members, inspection methods, and quality standards for the members.   
Referring to the above articles of KTAW, we would like to show how inspections 
were carried out to keep a high quality of products and to obtain trust for their 
quality certification labels from the market.54 
  KTAW set rules for issuing six types of quality certificate labels according 
to products: that is, fabrics for the export market, silk fabrics for the domestic 
market, mixed (silk and cotton) woven fabrics for the domestic market, cotton 
fabrics for the domestic market, woolen fabrics and linen fabrics, and thrown silk 
for materials.  Different colors of labels indicated the grades.  For example, in 
fabrics for export market, five grades carried gold, silver, red, green, or purple 
labels.  Labels for silk and cotton fabrics for domestic market had three grades, 
and inspectors seem to have been more careful when inspecting export products 
than those for domestic markets.55  A s  s h o w n  i n  F i g u r e  4, all fabrics were 
subject to inspection before fabric merchants could buy them.  A quality 
certificate label was attached to the inspected fabric, which weaving producers 
needed when they sold their fabrics to merchants.  Besides, weaving producers 
had to place their own stamps on the certificate label.  Another article states 
that KTAW required producers and merchants to be honest about their materials 
and production methods in order to maintain trust for Kiryu-brand in the market.   
Producers had to note the raw materials, weight, and dimensions of the fabric on 
their products with precision.  False declarations concerning the above items 
and the trading of defective goods, even due to negligence, were strictly 
prohibited. 
  The rules were both explicit and detailed regarding the required 
  21inspection methods for both fabrics and thrown silk as material.  The checklist 
for fabrics included the following six items: (i) producer’s stamp or dealer’s name, 
(ii) width, length, and weight, (iii) no false declarations of raw materials, (iv) no 
cheating, such as using minerals for fabrics, (v) weft yarns with uniform quality, 
and (vi) appropriate quality certificate label with producer’s stamp.  A similar 
checklist existed for thrown silk as materials. 
Until the Ministry of Commerce and Industry started inspection of fabrics 
for the export market in 1928, 56 KTAW played a critical role in the quality control 
of products for the export market.  Before inspection, fabrics for the export 
market required scouring, and the members of KTAW had to carry out the 
finishing process.  If inspectors determined that the fabric needed to be scoured 
again, producers could not refuse to do so.  KTAW even had a right to cut 
merchandise for inspection.  For the sale of export goods, producers needed not 
only a quality certificate label but also an inspection certificate with a stamp from 
the inspection clerk who worked for KTA W .   I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  f a b r i c s  f o r  t h e  
domestic market, the inspection clerk set the seal on the quality certificate label.  
In sum, it is clear that inspectors carried out their work more carefully on fabrics 
for the export market than on those for the domestic market. 
  Even as members’ fabrics underwent a strict inspection, the Kiryu Trade 
Association of Weaving had clear strategies for exploring new businesses.  The 
association followed two strategies for expanding the market during the Meiji 
Period.57    The first was to display fabrics in many exhibitions.    KTAW joined 54 
temporary exhibitions, including international and domestic expositions, 
competitive exhibitions, and shows at a famous hotel in Tokyo from 1893 to 
1914.58  They not only used temporary exhibitions but also set up a permanent 
showroom in the KTAW building.    The purpose of this permanent showroom was 
  22to display the many kinds of fabrics made in Kiryu, namely samples of 
Kiryu-brand.  In addition, the association collected samples there from other 
weaving districts in Japan and abroad for producers’ convenience.  Since KTAW 
protected one-year property rights for good designs or color combinations, which 
was valuable for improving the Kiryu-brand, it must have encouraged product 
innovations. 
The second strategy included releasing a few publications—a monthly 
magazine from 1894 to 1910 and a small booklet for introducing Kiryu-brand in 
1903 and 1908—along with displaying some sophisticated fabrics at a terminal 
station in Tokyo for advertising the Kiryu-brand.  Even though the monthly 
magazines were not published every year, they offered members valuable 
information on domestic and export markets, market conditions in Kiryu, and the 
out-weavers’ reputations for the purpose of multiple punishment.59  A s  a  m a i n  
advertiser, KTAW supported the monthly magazine Kakiage Times, published by 
the Kakiage Company [Kakiage Shoten], one of the leading fabric merchants in 
Kiryu.60  With this magazine, the company aimed to advertise Kiryu-brand to 
the market, improve the quality of products, and introduce new knowledge and 
technologies for entrepreneurs and merchants in Kiryu. 
  In sum, KTAW’s quality control measures contributed to creating and 
promoting the Kiryu-brand.  The KTAW-issued quality certificate labels were 
the source of the market’s trust in the Kiryu-brand.  Issuance of the quality 
certificate, which obliged honest declaration of quality by producers, must have 
reduced information asymmetry.    We can find some similarities between the case 
of Kiryu, explored here and in the well-organized employers’ trade association in 
the Lyon silk industry, which was established in the 1860s and which Pierre 
Vernus fully examines.  According to Vernus’ research, trade associations in the 
  23Lyon silk industry offered not only commercial information to members for 
reducing information asymmetries, but also provided legal and fiscal advice.  
Besides, trade associations contributed to the collective promotion of Lyon silk 
wares by implementing quality control, regulating putting-out relations, and 
developing crapes manufacturing. 61   A s  a  p r o v i d e r  o f  p u b l i c  g o o d s ,  b o t h  




I n  t h i s  a r t i c l e ,  w e  h a v e  f o c u s e d  o n  t h e  r o l e  o f  t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  w h i c h  
maintained and enhanced Marshallian agglomeration economies by facilitating 
the division and specialization of labor and organizing collective action.  We 
demonstrated that the growth in the real value of production in the Kiryu silk 
weaving district after the mid-Meiji Period occurred because the enterprises 
developed division of labor, particularly in the putting-out system and also 
through specialization of other processes.  The weaving producers themselves 
outsourced and organized various processes, such as scouring, dyeing, throwing 
yarns, weaving, and finishing ones.  Initiatives of KTAW, as well as financial 
support from the central government, also promoted specialization by joint 
facilities—that is, large two companies that enjoyed scale economies.  While the 
functions of KTAW were diverse, we can interpret it as the supplier of public 
goods.    Collective quality control by strict rules enabled the association to create 
and sustain the Kiryu-brand, and advertisement activities also contributed to 
market expansion in various ways.  With great effort, the Kiryu Trade 
Association also introduced new production knowledge and technology.  The 
diffusion of appropriate dyeing methods throughout the whole district, using 
  24synthetic dyestuff, was critical for improving the quality of fabrics in Kiryu.  
Finally, the Kiryu Trade Association created a mechanism for information 
dissemination regarding production knowledge and technology   
  The historical experience in Kiryu has a broader implication for 
stagnating industrial districts in contemporary developing economies that fail to 
introduce new production knowledge from abroad, as Tetsushi Sonobe and Keijiro 
Otsuka have explained.63  A s  w e  h a v e  s h o w n ,  i t  was difficult for individual 
entrepreneurs—for example, producers and merchants—to acquire advanced 
knowledge, especially from developed countries.  The awareness of such 
knowledge as public goods made entrepreneurs in industrial districts act together.   
To be successful, entrepreneurs should not concentrate on narrow interests or 
private advantage alone but should make an effort to build mutually beneficial 
collective organizations.  Of course, the history of local trade associations is 
replete with conflicts of interests and trial-and-error processes, including the 
development of the legal system.  However, it is critically important for the 
development of industrial districts/clusters that the industry create a collective 
mechanism, such as a local trade association, that provides new knowledge, keeps 
quality of products, and promotes local brand name, which are all relevant public 
goods.  Viewed from a historical perspective, stagnant individual 
districts/clusters in developing countries will not be able to grow, unless they 
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New Districts: 
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・Emerging districts expanded after 1880
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・Early introduction of power loom and factory system
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・Domestic market-oriented
・Highly value-added product






































































































































































Figure 2: Value of production in Kiryu, 1878-1915  1000 yen
Source:  Report on History of Weaving Industry in 
Gunma Prefecture [Gunmaken Orimonogyo Enkaku
Chosasho] (from 1878 to 1901);  Statistics of Gunma 
Prefecture [Gunmaken Tokeisho] (after 1902).
Note:   Figures from 1886 to 90  were estimated.  For 
realized values, we used price index for textile products 
(1934-1936=100) in Estimates of Long-term Economic 
Statistics 








1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920
Figure 3: Number of Weavers by types in Kiryu, 1906-1920
Number of out-weavers
Number of  factories, cottage industries, and weaving manufacturs
Source: Statistics of Gunma 






















































: material flowsTable 1 Real Value of Major Silk-Weaving Prefectures (1000yen)1
year
Prefecture Main District 3 1895 1900 1905 1910 growth rate (%)2
Yamagata Yonezawa, Tsuruoka 876 2412 1810 5368 12.8
Fukushima Kawamata 880 2703 4869 5370 12.8
Tochigi Ashikaga 2499 1522 875 1155 -5.0
Gunma Kiryu, Isesaki 5783 8525 6532 9672 3.4
Saitama Chichibu 892 3160 2113 4549 11.4
Tokyo Hachioji 2613 2356 2363 6783 6.5
Yamanashi Gunnai 1162 4419 2451 4264 9.0
Niigata Tochio 862 2641 2704 6575 14.5
Ishikawa Kanazawa 1264 4318 8319 11803 16.0
Fukui Fukui 4849 10777 15890 22071 10.6
Gifu Gifu 700 2144 1223 3231 10.7
Shiga Tango 733 1243 1163 1524 5.0
Kyoto Nishijin 9290 21413 11642 19524 5.0
Fukuoka Hakata 419 810 672 763 4.0
Notes:
1. All figures are deflated by price index for textile products (1934-36=100) in Estimate of Long-term Economic
 Statistics of Japan since 1868: Price, 192-93.
2. Annnual average growthrate from 1895 to 1910.
3. Districts in Italic are exporters of Habutae.
Source: Hashino 2007, Table 1-4, 41.